The Enigma of Reason
by Mercier and SperberIntuit first, then reasons
How do we know that reasons justify a specific conclusion? We intuit it! Reasoning comes from our ability to represent our own thoughts and our own confidence in our thoughts. We have intuitions about our intuitions, e.g. how confident an assertion is. For example: “I’m going to get that paper finished in a couple of days” - when giving that response you would have a sense of how accurate an estimate that actually is.
In this context the most important meta-intuitions are those about the reasons for our intuitions (see below quote’s reference to “metarepresentational intuitive inference”). The intuitive conclusions come first, then the reasons, then our assessment of the reasons as justifications for the intuitions. We use this module to also intuit the reasons for other people’s intuitions. Assessment and identification of reasons, whether they are ours or others’, uses the same module.
Comprehension always involves inference, even if, most of the time, we are not aware of it.
A simple first-pass way to define intuitions is to say that they are judgments (or decisions, which can also be quite intuitive) that we make and take to be justified without knowledge of the reasons that justifies them.
Recognizing that some fact is a reason for inferring a given conclusion can only be achieved through—what else?—another, higher-order inference.
Representations of representations, also known as higher-order representations or as metarepresentations, play a unique role in human cognition and social life.
One of the main claims of this book is that reasoning is not an alternative to intuitive inference; reasoning is a use of intuitive inferences about reasons. What makes humans capable of inferring their reasons is, we claim, their capacity for metarepresentational intuitive inference.
Contrary to the commonsense view, what happens is not that we derive intuitive conclusions from reasons that we would somehow possess. What we do, rather, is derive reasons for our intuitions from these intuitions themselves by a further process of intuitive backward inference. We infer what our reasons must have been from the conclusions we intuitively arrived at. We typically construct our reasons as an after-the-fact justification.
Reasons are for social consumption
“Flaws” in reasoning appear only because we are faced with contexts that our minds, and reason, did not evolve for We don’t reason for logical deduction or for decision-making. We do reason to coordinate and evaluate others. We justify our own actions and decisions, and evaluate others’ actions and decisions based on their reasoning.
The central thesis of the book is that human reason has two main functions corresponding to two main challenges of human interaction: the attribution of reasons serves primarily a justificatory function, and reasoning serves primarily an argumentative function.
We produce reasons in order to justify our thoughts and actions to others and to produce arguments to convince others to think and act as we suggest. We also use reason to evaluate not so much our own thought as the reasons others produce to justify themselves or to convince us.
Reasons act as justifications (and imply you can expect similar justifications from others) so that you can coordinate.
Reasons are used primarily not to guide oneself but to justify oneself in the eyes of others, and to evaluate the justifications of others (often critically).
We typically care about our reasons when our intuitions are challenged by other people or by further experience.
Humans constantly evaluate one another. Are the people we interact with competent and reliable? Is their judgment sound?
Reasons can also act as a reputation management device.
Someone’s reputation is, to a large extent, the ongoing effect of a conversation spread out in time and social space about that person’s reasons. In giving our reasons, we try to take part in the conversation about us and to defend our reputation. We influence the reputation of others by the way we evaluate and discuss their reasons.
Biased and lazy reasoning
Biased, in the sense that we generate many more reasons to support previous beliefs than those that would counteract them.
People are biased to find reasons that support their point of view because this is how they can justify their actions and convince others to share their beliefs.
Reasoning does not blindly confirm any belief it bears on. Instead, reasoning systematically works to find reasons for our ideas and against ideas we oppose. It always takes our side.
Lazy, in that we don’t examine our own reasons enough - this is left up to those to whom the reasons are presented through argument.
Unless our reputation is at stake, we are unlikely to seriously examine our own first-order intuitions in the light of our metarepresentational intuitions about reasons. Even if we do, the reasons that come easily to our mind are likely to confirm or even strengthen our initial intuitions.
We know of no evidence showing that humans exercise vigilance toward the content of their own perceptions and inferences (except in special cases where they have positive grounds to think that their senses or intuitions aren’t functioning well) … More generally, people seem to be unconcerned by their own incoherencies unless something—generally someone—comes up to make them salient.
Here’s the common thread in all these results: in each case, reason drives participants toward the decision that is easier to justify.
In modern contexts, the bias and laziness of reasons leads us to reason-based choice - a preference for reasons that are easiest to justify to others.
Reasons are for arguments
This is because reasoning evolved in a social context - ultimately reasons are for social consumption.
Our communicative abilities are tailored to the interactive context in which they naturally function.
Reason should make the best of the interactive nature of dialogue, refining justifications and arguments with the help of the interlocutors’ feedback.
Still, even for problems that do not have a single definite solution, group performance is generally above that of the average group member. In some cases it is even superior to that of the best individual in the group.
In small-scale populations, people are very cautious with their assertions, only stating a position when they have a good reason to (unlike, say, pundits).
Because reasoning is biased and lazy, we need interaction with others to push past these flaws and actually differentiate the good reasons from the bad, rather than those that agree with your intuitive conclusion.
In argumentative reasoning in particular, the use of logical relationship plays a heuristic role for one’s audience. It helps challenge them to examine and enrich or revise their beliefs or else to defend them with arguments in their turn. Thanks in part to its logical garb, argumentation, if not always convincing, is at least quite generally challenging.
as a communicator addressing a vigilant audience, your chances of being believed may be increased by making an honest display of the very coherence your audience will anyhow be checking.
When like-minded people argue, all they do is provide each other with new reasons supporting already held beliefs. Just like solitary reasoners, groups of like-minded people can be victims of belief polarization, overconfidence, and belief perseverance.